

APPENDIX AA-1
NUCLEAR TERRORISM RESPONSE

I. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

- A. Primary responsibility for an incident involving an improvised nuclear weapon rests with the Federal government and is defined in Tab AA-1-1, "The Federal Bureau of Investigations, Department of Defense and Department of Energy Joint Agreement for Response to Improvised Nuclear Device Incident".
- B. Types of nuclear terrorist threats:
 - 1. Dispersal of radioactive threats.
 - 2. Detonation of a conventional bomb salted with radioactive material (Plutonium, Strontium or other known radioactive isotope) otherwise known as a "dirty bomb".
 - 3. Detonation of an improvised nuclear explosive device.
 - 4. Detonation of a nuclear weapon.

II. MISSION

- A. To prepare a coordinated response in the event any of the above types of attack occur.
- B. To facilitate life saving, fire suppression, and rescue efforts, and the continuation of governmental operations. This will be accomplished in accordance with Annex AA, Homeland Security, and other applicable sections of the Emergency Operation Plan (EOP).

III. DIRECTION AND CONTROL

- A. All responses to nuclear terrorist event will be conducted under the command and control provisions of Annex AA, Homeland Security. The National Incident Management System (NIMS) will be used.
- B. Agencies described below which possess specific skills and training will provide guidance and advice to the Incident Commander in support of the overall response.

IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

- A. Operations and missions under this section will be done in the Preparatory, Response and Recovery phases as in Annex AA.

- B. Under federal law the federal government assumes the responsibility of responding to any incident involving the criminal misuse of nuclear materials, to include improvised nuclear devices, nuclear dispersal devices, or stolen nuclear weapons. This document is at Tab AA-1-1.
- C. As “first responders” local and state government agencies will be responsible for carrying out their normal emergency responsibilities as defined in the Marshall County Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) until the federal government assumes the responsibility from the Governor, County Judge/Executive or Mayor.
- D. Standard safety and health considerations, as outlined in Annex Q, concerning hazard materials will be followed. Downwind and hot zone determinations will be established as soon as possible. See Tab AA-3-1 on time, distance and shielding.
- E. Once Federal agents arrive on the scene and assume responsibility for finding the weapon, deactivating the weapon, or dealing with the consequences of the weapon, state and local agencies will provide support to requesting federal agencies by carrying out any protective action not in conflict with the federal response.
- F. Upon the federal government assuming responsibility the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will establish the necessary liaison with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Kentucky Division of Emergency Management (KyEM), the Health and Family Services Cabinet (H&FSC), the Environmental and Public Protection Cabinet (E&PPC), plus local officials as designated by the Mayor and County Judge/Executive.
- G. Federal Agency Tasks and Responsibilities:
 - 1. The following outline of agency tasks and responsibilities is provided for guidance and should be the basis for developing supporting plans and operating procedures.
 - a. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) – Although local government is responsible for the protection of the public health and safety from nuclear hazards, the FBI, by Federal Statute, is the lead investigative agency in all cases involving radioactive material. As the lead agency, the FBI is responsible for the investigative functions while the aspects of search and assessment of nuclear threats is delegated to the US Department of Energy (DOE), or to the state. In addition the FBI will:
 - 1) Alert FBI headquarters and all appropriate local, state and federal agencies.

- 2) Coordinate all investigative efforts with the military and civilian law enforcement agencies involved.
 - 3) Assist in the assessment of the threat.
 - 4) Coordinate news releases regarding all aspects of the threat and operations.
 - 5) Provide a location at, or near, the FBI command center for representatives of all assisting agencies to receive updates, commit resources and coordinate all activities.
 - 6) Other responsibilities outlined in Annex AA.
- b. Department of Energy (DOE) – With threats involving Special Nuclear Material (SNM) DOE will accept responsibility for control and coordination of the nuclear aspects of the operation. In addition, upon arrival, DOE will provide radiological assistance to the state and local agencies having the regularly constituted authority for the protection of the general public health and safety in accordance with Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan. Representatives of DOE, or its Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) will integrate operationally with the FBI and other agencies. Duties include:
- 1) Alert state and other federal agencies as appropriate.
 - 2) Assist in the threat assessment.
 - 3) Assist in the search for, and analysis of the nuclear device in accordance with current DOE plans.
 - 4) Prepare input regarding nuclear and radiological aspects of the threat and operations for news release.
- c. Department of Defense (DOD) – Will have primary responsibility for incidents involving military weaponry and other threats as follows:
- 1) Military Weapons – In threats involving military nuclear weapons the responsible military service, or the FBI has jurisdiction. However when control of the nuclear weapon is lost into the civilian sector the FBI assumes jurisdictional responsibility for recovery and control of the weapon.
 - 2) Other threats – DOD will provide technical support when requested through the FBI. Such support will include those functions within the purview of DOD and to the extent that the principle military mission is not compromised. These functions will include, but are not limited to:

- a) Assist in providing security.
 - b) Assist in locating the device.
 - c) Assist in deactivating and removing the device.
 - d. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) – DHS will have the responsibility for coordinating the emergency planning and close out operations following resolution of the criminal aspects of the nuclear misuse. Once the device is deactivated and secured, or clean-up operations commence, DHS will assume command of the incident from the FBI. This is done as described in Annex V, Recovery, to the EOP.
- H. Pursuant to Presidential Decision Directive 39, and Homeland Security Directive 3 & 5, the FBI will assume command and control of the incident management while criminal misuse activities exist. This means that all agencies will be expected to cooperate under the direction of the FBI.
- I. It is not intended that this document should supersede any DOD directive currently in effect regarding the handling of DOD special devices.
- J. Local government agencies will notify the FBI, KSP, and KyEM immediately upon receiving a nuclear weapons threat.
- K. Response.
- 1. Should a nuclear threat occur which requires meeting deadlines or making concessions during a very short time interval, the local agency receiving the threat may, by necessity, have to respond using only those skills and resources immediately available. Concessions to demands in nuclear extortion are of national interest and must be carefully evaluated. However, the nearest FBI field division, KSP and KyEM must be immediately notified of the threat. These agencies will alert additional resources and persons in order to have them available as quickly as possible.
 - 2. Some threat demands may provide time for a more deliberate, orderly and effective response. This will permit a more thorough evaluation of the threat. The following guidelines provide a basis for response action.
 - a. The Threat.
 - 1) Nuclear threats may be received by phone, mail, courier services, tape recordings, or electronic transmission. Regardless of the mode in which it is received the individual or agency receiving the threat should preserve all materials and information for investigative purposes.
 - 2) This and all information regarding the threat must be forwarded to the FBI as soon as possible, as a part of the notification process. In as

much as the exact wording and tone of a threat message can be of invaluable assistance in determining the credibility and potential hazard associated with the threat, it is imperative that the exact wording and tone be conveyed accurately.

- 3) Everything associated with the threat should be handled carefully and preserved as evidence for future examination and evaluation by experts. As few people as possible should physically touch the evidence.
- b. Notification – The FBI and KyEM should be contacted immediately upon receipt of a nuclear threat. The telephone number for the FBI is 502-583-3941. The number for KyEM is 800-255-2587 and the number for KSP is 800-222-5555.
 - c. Threat Credibility Assessment – The FBI, in conjunction with the DOE, KSP and local law enforcement agencies involved, will provide for assessment of the threat. Credibility must be continuously reviewed and assessed as investigative and search intelligence is acquired.
 - d. Coordination Between Agencies -
 - 1) The nucleus of agencies with immediate interest will be as a minimum, the FBI, FEMA, DOE, DOD, SFM, KSP, KyEM, Marshall County OEM, H&FSC and E&PPC. The FBI as the lead investigative agency will coordinate with all involved agencies in order to maintain continuity and cohesiveness of the actions taken. Command decisions will be made by members of this task group with regard to the discharge of their responsibilities as the situation develops. All action decisions will clear through the state EOC and the on-scene command post.
 - 2) An on-scene command post will be established where the involved agencies can meet to evaluate information, make operational decisions based on the available information and to solve the technical problems involved in the search, identification and removal of any device.
 - 3) One Joint Information Center (JIC) will be established through which all agencies will communicate with the media. Due to the potential for public panic in this type of situation no releases will be made without approval and coordination with the Incident Commander. PIO's from the several agencies will assist in the media coordination of the event.
 - e. Investigation – The investigation of a viable threat is a basic responsibility of the FBI. However the cooperation of all involved agencies is essential to the mounting of an effective investigation.
 - f. Search

- 1) Once it has been determined that the nuclear threat is credible and protective actions commensurate with the situation have been taken a search for the device should begin. Sophisticated search equipment will be provided by NEST. Premature searching may arouse public awareness and unwanted concern. If the response time is very short the search should be started by the responding local agency or KSP.
- 2) When the demands are to be met in a longer time period, search for a nuclear device will be conducted by NEST, as requested by the FBI, with appropriate local and state agencies assisting.
- 3) Prior to the arrival of NEST, a visual search by persons familiar with the area may be conducted. Concurrent with this search, law enforcement, in cooperation with the FBI will provide as much additional information as possible about the threat and its source.
- 4) If radiation detection equipment is used in the initial search it should be remembered that commonly available meters (including all civil defense meters) are incapable or, at best, unreliable for the detection of alpha, beta, or low energy gamma emitters.

g. Device Located

- 1) If a suspected nuclear device is found during the search prior to the arrival of NEST the area should be evacuated and other protective measures taken. DOE and CHS will advise the area to be evacuated. Prior to the arrival of trained Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) personnel NO ATTEMPT shall be made to neutralize, deactivate or move the device.
- 2) When a military nuclear weapon is involved a military EOD team will handle the deactivation and removal of the weapon.
- 3) If an improvised device is involved designated personnel from DOE and DOD, familiar with design characteristics of nuclear weapons or improvised devices, will determine the appropriate actions to be taken.
- 4) If a nuclear weapon is found only DOE nuclear weapons expert and/ or specially trained EOD teams will be involved.

h. Protective Action

- 1) Protective actions are nonsequential because it may be necessary to institute them at any time, or reapply them as a situation develops. They should be considered in two phases:

- a) Those actions (preventative) taken to prevent loss of life, injury, or destruction of property.
 - b) Those actions (restorative) that would be taken if the threat should be carried out.
- 2) H&FSC, Radiation Health and Toxic Agents Branch, is responsible for recommending protective actions to the Governor or the Director of KyEM, in accordance with this annex.
- i. Medical – In the event of a nuclear detonation or the dispersal of radioactive materials, special medical care may be required for irradiated and/ or contaminated patients. Most hospitals are not equipped with adequate facilities and trained personnel for required treatment; thus, cases of severe exposure should be directed to the University of Kentucky Medical Center, University of Louisville Hospital, St. Luke's Hospital in Fort Thomas, Lourdes Hospital in Paducah, or REACTS in Oak Ridge, TN.
 - 1) Local – Local government is responsible for planning and coordinating medical services during the emergency. The medical plan shall provide for:
 - a) Identification, coordination, and control of local medial emergency response forces.
 - b) Medical planning including destination, training, and exercising medical facilities and personnel.
 - c) Special medical treatment and services required for treating radiation-exposed and/ or contaminated patients.
 - d) Coordination of assistance provided by hospitals, clinics, medical associations, health, and other societies and quasi-governmental groups.
 - 2) State – H&FSC is responsible for emergency medical care in support of local government and will provide:
 - a) Technical advice.
 - b) Procurement of special equipment and services, such as, whole body counters, laboratory services, decontamination facilities and the disposal of radioactive waste.
 - c) Emergency procurement, storage, distribution, and handling of supplemental medical supplies.

- d) Liaison with KyEM.
- e) Procedures for procuring medical assistance from the other state agencies.
- 3) Federal – Federal agencies will provide technical assistance, equipment and supplementary resources in support of medical operations.
- j. Health – After the spread of radioactive materials special health problems result from radioactive contamination. Therefore, plans for health services must address this problem as well as normal sanitation and other health concerns.
 - 1) Local – Local government is responsible for providing health and sanitation services. These services include, but are not limited to:
 - a) Personnel decontamination.
 - b) Sanitation in reception centers.
 - c) Inspection of food to determine radioactive contamination.
 - d) Protection of agricultural products from contamination.
 - e) Procedures for procuring medical assistance from state agencies.
 - 2) State
 - a) KyEM will coordinate the efforts of all necessary state agencies to support local emergency operations.
 - b) H&FSC will have the responsibility for the administration and application of health service support and will provide resources, personnel and technical advice.
 - 3) Federal – Appropriate agencies can provide supplementary emergency equipment, supplies and technical support to local health authorities. Local jurisdictions should forward their requests to KyEM, which will notify DHS for assistance from appropriate agencies.
- k. Public Information
 - 1) Though information of all types, from many different sources will be processed, some types are more important than others. In recognition of this fact and the necessity of using available public information facilities in the most efficient and effective manner, the following

priorities are established:

- a) Lifesaving – Information essential to survival, health, and safety before, during and after the incident.
 - b) Recovery – Information concerning disaster recovery and relief programs and services.
 - c) Other – Non-emergency information released by participating government and volunteer agencies.
- 2) Coordination of releases; In coordination with the FBI all other involved agencies will be responsible for preparing releases pertaining to their activities. All state releases will be made through the KyEM PIO. These will be prepared in accordance with the sections of the EOP, which pertain to the Joint Information Center.
- I. Other State Resources
- 1) The State Fire Marshall is responsible for coordinating fire suppression, equipment, and manpower in support of local government.
 - 2) E&PPC is responsible for providing technical assistance to local governments concerning water and air quality sampling.
- m. Restoration – The problems to be solved and the work required during restoration may be complicated by the presence of radioactive contamination. Thus, local government may require state and federal support. This support, and the procedures associated with restoration is addressed in Annex V, Recovery, to the EOP.
- 1) Local – Local government is responsible for the evacuation of, and reentry to, affected areas. Tasks that may have to be undertaken during this period include:
 - a) Decontamination of property and food supplies.
 - b) Security of evacuated areas to prevent unauthorized entry and vandalism.
 - c) Mass care and welfare.
 - d) Monitoring of people and property for radiation contamination.
 - e) Transportation

- f) Identification and disposal of contaminated materials which cannot be decontaminated.
 - g) Engineer support.
 - h) Long-term radiation monitoring.
 - i) Control of radiation exposure to the public and workers.
 - j) In concert with state and federal agencies, establish a program for dealing with long-term medical problems.
- 2) State – KyEM will coordinate state support during the emergency and recovery.
 - 3) Federal – FEMA will provide assistance to state and local government upon request.

V. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT

- A. Support of these operations will consist of assistance from all applicable state agencies, local government and necessary federal agencies.
- B. Resources committed to a nuclear terrorist emergency will be assigned in accordance with the principles in the Basic Emergency Operations Plan.

VI. GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS

- A. Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents EPA 400-R-92-0001 of October 1991.

VII. TABS

- AA-1-1 Joint Federal Agreement
- AA-1-2 Weapon Material
- AA-1-3 Radiation Exposure
- AA-1-4 Protective Actions
- AA-1-5 Search Techniques
- AA-1-6 Threat Documentation
- AA-1-7 Federal Response Scenario